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Abstract 
When the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (‘UNDRIP’) in 2007, many extolled it for recognising Indigenous peoples’ right of 
self-determination. Although there is some consensus that all peoples have self-determination, as a legal 
claim it has routinely inspired criticism that it will lead to contradictory claims, interpretations, and 
further political contestation. Ten years after UNDRIP’s endorsement, some Indigenous claims of self-
determination in Australia are contradictory. While contradictory claims may not be inherently 
problematic, in the context explored in this article, there are problematic effects. This article examines 
how contradictory self-determination claims arose in response to Australia’s recent Native Title 
Amendment (Indigenous Land Use Agreements) Act 2017 (Cth) (‘2017 Amendments’), which amended 
and weakened the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘NTA’). It also evaluates the consequences of those 
contradictory claims and argues for renewed critical assessment of who legitimately determines the self 
who claims self-determination.  
 




In 2007 the UN General Assembly endorsed the UNDRIP.1 It recognised Indigenous 
peoples’ self-determination,2 which other international instruments had not previously done.3 
With international recognition that Indigenous peoples have self-determination, in theory, 
international law no longer regulated those individuals and communities as minorities of State 
populations4 – a classification many resisted.5 Since then, scholars, advocates and Indigenous 
peoples have constructed an immense body of scholarship on self-determination with a 
particular focus on Indigenous peoples’ self-determination.6 In some ways, the amount of 
scholarship on Indigenous peoples and self-determination reflects longstanding historical 
concerns about the concept. For instance, when Woodrow Wilson proposed ‘self-
determination’ in a draft League of Nations charter, his delegation and fellow allies dismissed 
it.7 Wilson’s Secretary of State Robert Lansing said that self-determination was, ‘loaded with 
dynamite … . In the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist, who 
Please download the final, published copy in the International Journal of Human Rights.  
2 
 
failed to realize the danger until too late’.8 Lansing was critical of Woodrow’s ‘idealism’ 
because identifying one group as a holder of self-determination would deny it to a competing 
group.9 Later, Michla Pomerance would later assert that ‘the first and pivotal question is: who 
is the ‘self’ to whom the right of self-determination attaches?’10 Questioning the ‘self’ to whom 
the right attaches is as pertinent as ever, especially in the Indigenous rights context when claims 
of self-determination contradict each other.  
When UNDRIP was endorsed, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States 
voted against it.11 They claimed, among other issues, that self-determination was legally 
unworkable.12 When those States endorsed UNDRIP in 2009 or 2010, they upheld the 
instrument as aspirational.13 Today, Indigenous people are claiming self-determination. And 
one might adopt a view, like James Tully’s, that settler-states that have illegitimately asserted 
sovereignty on colonial and imperial bases have opportunities to legitimate their sovereign 
claims by recognising Indigenous peoples’ equal status as sovereigns and negotiating with 
them on a ‘nation-to-nation’ basis.14 While that would seem to predominantly benefit States, 
Tully also writes that Indigenous peoples ‘struggle within the structure of domination vis-à-vis 
techniques of government, by exercising their freedom of thought and action with the aim of 
modifying the system in the short term and transforming it from within in the long term’.15 
But a careful examination of State legal contexts reveals that identifying the ‘self’ to 
whom self-determination attaches remains a pivotal question – especially when self-
determination claims contradict one another. The problem is not that self-determination is 
legally unworkable, as those settler-states originally maintained. Problems arise, as Patrick 
Macklem writes, that ‘[a] community is not an indigenous people in international law until a 
State or group of State recognizes it as such’.16 Although Indigenous peoples can self-identify, 
Macklem’s point is that State actors must recognise a community as Indigenous peoples to 
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uphold and enforce international law’s human rights for them. And if, as evaluated here, self-
determination ostensibly provides groups or communities with the power to determine their 
selves, that power is undermined to the extent States play a role in recognising, determining, 
or constructing which self has self-determination. I agree with Tully that when Indigenous 
peoples assert self-determination, settler-states have an opportunity to legitimate its sovereign 
claims by recognising Indigenous peoples’ equal status as sovereigns and negotiating with 
them on a ‘nation-to-nation’ basis.17 But where a State plays a role in recognising the self, those 
who ‘struggle within the structure of domination vis-à-vis techniques of government’, are also 
discursively modified and transformed through exercises of their freedom of thought to be 
recognisable as a Nation.18  
When contradictory self-determination claims arise, theorising ‘who are Indigenous 
peoples’,19 or ‘what is self-determination’,20 cannot answer how States choose to recognise a 
community as a Nation or as Indigenous people with self-determination. Asking those 
questions belies Wilson’s idealism in expropriating legal subjects and objects from existing 
legal contexts and fails to address Pomerance’s ‘first and pivotal question’. As argued here, 
who the State recognises cannot be apprehended by retrospectively reading who ‘wins’ and 
‘loses’ cases or claims. Instead, this article builds upon Judith Butler’s acknowledgement that 
‘the law produces and then conceals the notion of “a subject before the law” in order to invoke 
that discursive formation as a naturalized foundational premise that subsequently legitimates 
that law’s own regulatory hegemony’.21 As such, this article makes a methodological 
intervention based upon Butler’s notion of performativity to problematise how State laws are 
involved in producing the subjects it recognises, which legitimates the State’s own regulatory 
and colonial hegemony. I argue that States recognise those Indigenous peoples who 
performatively replicate the exclusionary domain of a Nation, which the State then includes 
within its regulatory domain as a subject.22 The State does so to legitimate its own assertions 
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of sovereignty as well as the nation-hood and self-determination claims of those it recognises, 
which are those claimants who work alongside and do not attempt to undermine or question 
the State. One effect is a modification and transformation of the particular social, political 
economic relationships between the State and the claimant it recognises, which maintains as it 
reproduces the structural social, political and economic colonial status quo.23 Another effect is 
that the State’s validation of that performative also creates a domain of ‘abject’ beings.24 Butler 
explains that entrance of ‘a subject before the law’ into an exclusionary domain also produces 
‘abject beings, those who are not yet “subjects” but who form the constitutive outside to the 
domain of the subject’.25 As we will see, those who claim self-determination which the State 
does not recognise, and despite their self-identify as a people or a nation, are treated as 
minorities. The contradictory claims of self-determination that arose in response Australia’s 
recent 2017 Amendments of the NTA reveal how the State recognises those Indigenous people 
who construct themselves in ways that mirror the exclusionary domain of a Nation by 
themselves contributing to the production of their own abject beings, National minorities.  
Because this article examines and problematises the role of the State in producing who 
is identified as having self-determination, Section 1 provides a succinct history of the 
construction of the Australian Nation, Australia’s Native Title regime, and the human rights 
criticism that arose of it in 1998. Section 2 examines the case law that led to the 2017 
Amendments and excavates how the NTA produced legal struggles which gave rise to 
contradictory self-determination claims. Section 3 then discusses and analyses how State actors 
identify, select, or side with those self-determination claimants that support and reproduce the 
exclusionary domains of State legality and some consequences.  
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1. A brief history of NTA, 1998 human rights criticism, and the Bygrave standard 
This section provides a succinct history of the construction of the Australian Nation, its 
native title regime, and the human rights criticism that arose of it in 1998. It reveals how the 
colonies asserted that it was ‘people’, became a Nation, included Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islanders in its definition of ‘people’, and recognised native title, while continuously 
maintaining an exclusionary domain. It then begins to examine how and when international 
human rights of Indigenous people were used to critique Australia’s native title.   
The people identified today as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have, 
according to the Western archaeological discipline, inhabited what is known as Australia 
anywhere from 50,000 to 60,000 years ago.26 Colonists landed and established a penal colony 
in 1788 that they named New South Wales. It became a formal colony in 1823,27 with additional 
settlements forming throughout the 19th Century. In the late 19th Century, the colonies asserted 
that they were a ‘people’ and become a Federated Commonwealth – a Nation – which the 
British Parliament and then Queen Victoria assented to in 1901.28 The Commonwealth’s 
understanding of ‘the people’ excluded Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders,29 which reveals 
the Australia Nation’s exclusionary domain at that time. It become more overtly inclusive 
when, in 1967, the Australian people voted to amend the Constitution to include Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples in the census and allow the Commonwealth to create laws 
for them. Even if Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders became recognisable citizens of the 
State, the State did not yet recognise a ‘native’ title to property.  
In 1992, Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) (‘Mabo’) found that native title and Crown 
sovereignty co-existed, but only where the Crown had not exhibited a ‘clear and plain intention’ 
to extinguish native title.30 Regarding extinguishment, Irene Watson charges that it is a ‘power 
of colonialism’ the State has ‘assumed to determine that First Nations Peoples’ title to land no 
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longer exists’.31 In comparison, Watson argues that ‘the philosophical and jurisprudential 
frameworks that underpin First Nations laws do not enable the extinguishment of law to 
occur’.32 Essentially, the application of common law produced a new type of subject, a native 
title claimant that had extinguishable title, and then concealed the notion of the subject before 
law, by stating that had always been the case.33 The abject domain then contained, as an 
example, First Nation laws that do not enable the extinguishment of their law. 
In the year after Mabo, Parliament passed the NTA. Damien Short explains that 
‘commercial interests lobbied the government to ensure that when [native title] rights were 
institutionalized via legislation, they would pose no threat to commercial interests and maintain 
existing inequalities’.34 Commercial interests were able to do so by transforming a right claim 
that posed a ‘minor problem for an enormously affluent industrial lobby’ into a ‘national 
crisis’.35  The result was that one of the NTA’s objectives was to ‘establish ways in which future 
dealings affecting native title may proceed and to set standards for those dealings’.36 To provide 
that objective with legal effect, the NTA created a Future Dealings process called the Right to 
Negotiate (RTN). It sought to facilitate development projects by validly extinguishing native 
title rights that conflict with those proposed land uses. As initially created, the RTN is a 
structured negotiation process facilitated by the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT). It 
enables grantees (developers) to petition the NNTT or Minister to decide whether the 
development may proceed.37 Under that process, the members of the registered native title 
claimant (RNTC) can agree to an RTN, which may extinguish native title rights. Where RNTC 
members do not agree, then so long as six months of negotiation have taken place and the 
developer exhibits good faith, the NNTT or Minister must determine that the ‘doing of the act’ 
may be done or not.38 The RTN has and continues to override native title claimants’ objections 
and may extinguish native title where the grantee may do the act39 – which Watson identified, 
above, as the ‘power of colonialism’. Essentially, the Australian legal system’s identification 
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of native title rights produces those claimants, who the RNTC represents, and their 
extinguishable rights.  
The 1997 Wik Peoples v Queensland case held that pastoral leases were not granted 
under the common law so that pastoral leases and native title could exist over the same lands.40 
In response, Parliament passed the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) (‘1998 
Amendments’). The 1998 Amendments were another legislative reaction to a judicial opinion 
that, borrowing from Short, ‘would pose no threat to commercial interests and maintain existing 
inequalities’.41 It also added a second Future Dealings process called Indigenous Land Use 
Agreements (ILUAs). ILUAs sought to ‘facilitate the negotiation of voluntary but binding 
agreements as an alternative to more formal native title machinery’ outside of the NNTT’s 
structuring.42 However, for the NNTT to register an ILUA, members of the RNTC need to 
approve it. Who or what comprises the RNTC, how the law produces its subjects, and how 
subjects produce themselves to be identifiable within the settler-state are the central issues 
explored below.  
Adding the ILUAs process increased flexibility and efficiency of the NTA, but the 1998 
Amendments drew significant criticism.43 Importantly, the United Nation Committee for the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) criticised the 1998 Amendments as inconsistent 
with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
and Australia’s Racial Discrimination Act.44 CERD noted that the ‘provisions … replace the 
right to negotiate with the lesser right to be consulted and to object to the land use’, and 
criticised Australia’s narrowing of what native title claims would be considered valid.45 It also 
noted that the 1998 Amendments were inconsistent with its General Recommendations XXI 
and XXIII, which require States to recognise Indigenous self-determination and ensure that ‘no 
decisions directly relating to [Indigenous] rights and interests are taken without their informed 
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consent’.46 The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples notes that free, prior 
and informed consent (FPIC) ‘needs to be understood in the context of indigenous peoples’ 
right to self-determination because it is an integral element of that right’.47 UNDRIP recognises 
both FPIC and self-determination.48 Parliament never amended the NTA to address CERD’s 
criticisms.  
CERD’s criticisms of the NTA are significant for at least two reasons. First, CERD’s 
criticisms may act as a yardstick for measuring the NTA against international human rights law. 
And, second, to the extent CERD’s criticism is treated as yardstick – some sort of objective 
standard for measurement – it treats the subject of those rights claims, Indigenous peoples, as 
an idealised or abstract subject. The subject is ‘idealised’ or ‘abstract’ in the sense that CERD 
treats all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders as a singular or collective ‘Indigenous peoples’ 
– a singular self with international legal subjectivity – that opposes the 1998 Amendments for 
not upholding its self-determination and FPIC. As explored below, when Aboriginal 
communities claim self-determination and FPIC, they do not always act as a singular or 
collective self nor are those claims always against legislative amendment.  
Although there are cases after 1998 that alter and narrow the NTA,49 the next case 
described here, which also reveals how the law discursively produces its subjects, is from 2010. 
In 2010, a Federal Court evaluated the composition of the RNTC – those who can agree to an 
ILUA – in QGC Pty Ltd v Bygrave (No 2) (‘Bygrave’).50 In Bygrave, a natural gas company 
sought to enter into an ILUA with the Iman peoples. The company obtained eight of nine 
signatures of the Iman listed as the RNTC members. The ninth named RNTC member refused 
to sign, and hence the NNTT refused to give notice for the ILUA’s registration, effectively 
prohibiting it from being registered.51 A question in Bygrave was whether the RNTC was a 
‘collective entity’ or comprised of all individuals members of the RNTC.52 Justice Reeves 
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found that the RNTC was not a legal person, so it was neither a collective entity nor all the 
named individuals. Instead, Reeves held that the RNTC was one or more persons named in the 
RNTC acting in a representative capacity, so the ILUA was registerable despite one member 
withholding their signature.53 In short, Justice Reeves interpreted and shaped the RNTC to 
represent a majority interest, which made registering ILUAs more flexible and economically 
efficient by weakening the ILUA registration standard. 
Experts estimate that between 2010 and 2017, industry members entered into around 
120 ILUAs with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander RNTCs under the Bygrave standard.54 
In early 2017, a Full Federal Court decided McGlade v Native Title Registrar (‘McGlade’),55 
which overturned Bygrave and held that all RNTC members must agree to an ILUA to be 
registrable. Commonwealth Parliament then proposed and eventually passed the 2017 
Amendments in response McGlade, which reinstituted the Bygrave standard. The contradictory 
claims of self-determination, which are the primary focus this article, arose in response to the 
proposed 2017 Amendments. The following section analyses the cases leading to the 2017 
Amendments for how they produce contradictory self-determination claims.  
2. The contradictory claims of self-determination 
The next two sub-sections examine and evaluate how self-determination claims arose 
in two contexts, the Noongar’s and the Wangan and Jagalingou’s. Regardless of whether the 
self-determination claimants support or oppose the 2017 Amendments, claiming it expresses 
individual and community interests. However, the claims arose out of problems the NTA 
produced, which has implications for understanding how the State plays a role in determining 
who has self-determination. 
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A. Noongar claims to self-determination 
The McGlade case involved Noongar communities in southwest Australia. It sought to 
resolve controversies that arose in two cases that were read together, Bennell v Western 
Australia (‘Bennell’); Bodney v State of Western Australia (‘Bodney’).56  In those cases, a 
Federal court interrogated who legally comprises the Noongar to resolve the contradictory six 
native title claims that the petitioners presented. In Bennell, 80 applicants acting on behalf of 
all Noongar – and positioning itself as the Noongar Nation – brought one native title claim to 
cover the entirety of south-west Western Australia. That claim arose from the South West 
Aboriginal Land and Sea Council’s (SWALSC’s) efforts to aggregate all outstanding native 
title claims into a single claim for the entirety of Noongar country.57 In Bodney, petitioners 
presented the other five native title claims. They asserted native title claims to Perth and the 
surrounding urban areas, which were territories the Bennell petitioners also claimed. As such, 
the Bodney and Bennell native title claims conflicted: if the Bennell claimants proved their 
claims, it would be detrimental to the Bodney claims, and vice versa. The Bennell claimants 
asserted that the Noongar peoples and, hence, the Noongar Nation observed their own laws and 
customs when settlers formed Western Australia in 1829 as they do today.58 On the other hand, 
the Bodney petitioners asserted there were multiple groups with distinct interests. They sought 
to preserve their interests against the Bennell petitioner. The Australian Commonwealth, the 
State of Western Australia, local government, and industry groups also asserted there were 
multiple groups with distinct issues because the Bennell petitioner’s far larger claims could 
presumably undermine Western Australia’s and Perth’s colonial legitimacy and some 
commercial interests. 
Presiding over the cases, Justice Wilcox, noted that the Noongar had several dialects, 
but found that ‘a striking feature of the evidence of the Aboriginal witnesses was that none of 
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them treated their local name as a sufficient, or even primary, statement of their identity. Each 
of them strongly asserted they were “Noongar”, although a Noongar associated with a 
particular local group’.59 In constituting the Noongar as a singular people, Wilcox upheld the 
Bennell claims to the detriment of the Bodney claims (as well as government and industry 
interests).60 Wilcox did not determine the precise nature of the native title rights, whether native 
title rights existed, were extinguished, or if the Noongar were entitled to compensation.61 The 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commission hailed Bennell as the ‘first 
decision that native title existed over a capital city in Australia’.62 Despite praise for the ruling, 
and because Wilcox had not determined many outstanding issues, many believed that the urban 
expansion of Perth extinguished many of the native title rights in and around that capital city, 
which both the Bodney and Bennell petitioners claimed.63 Shortly afterwards, the Full Federal 
Court overturned Wilcox’s ruling in Bodney v Bennell.64 It found that Justice Wilcox erred in 
treating Noongar land as a whole because, at that stage of analysis, the Noongar Nation 
petitioners had not proven continued observance of traditional laws and customs to all of that 
land since 1829. 
Rather than pursue additional rounds of litigation, the Noongar Nation began 
negotiating a settlement with Western Australia.65 The ability of the SWALSC to constitute 
itself as the Noongar Nation and pursue negotiations with Western Australia starts to reveal 
how State actors validate the identity on those who performatively replicate the State’s 
exclusionary domain. That is, even if Bodney v Bennell overturned the ruling favouring the 
Bennell petitioners, SWALSC/Noongar Nation’s negotiations with Western Australia excluded 
the interests of the Bodney petitioners. The Noongar Nation reproduced the exclusionary 
domain of the State and the Bodney petitioners thus constituted the abject domain by becoming 
the presumptive ‘minorities’ of the Noongar Nation.  
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Western Australia and the Noongar Nations reached an Agreement-in-Principle in 
October 2014. The Noongar then met, and a majority voted to approve the Agreement-in-
Principle as six separate ILUAs. However, there was internal opposition. Herbert Kenneth 
Bropho, a co-petitioner in Bodney v Bennell (who supported the Bodney claims) told reporters 
that the SWALSC ‘was picking and choosing the family members that were allowed in the 
meeting, they had a bus load of people going to the meeting who was the “yes” vote’.66 Despite 
those concerns, the agreement received acclaim from politicians67 and academics68 – and for a 
good reason. It is the most comprehensive native title settlement, with some calling it 
Australia’s ‘First Treaty’.69 It recognises the Noongar’s laws, cultures and self-government, 
transfers 320,000 hectares of Crown land to be held in Trust for their benefit, and provides a 
compensatory package of $1.3 billion (AUD) for the ‘loss, surrender, diminution, impairment 
and other effects’ of any native title rights.70 It was a good deal for both negotiating parties. 
The Noongar Nation received land, compensation, and recognition from Western Australia as 
a legitimate Nation. In turn, Western Australia maintained legal security and commercial 
stability by resolving all potential native title claims in the southwest, which could otherwise 
have questioned the legitimacy of its colonial acquisition of title. Problematically, the 
settlement overrode the Bodney petitioners’ interests and traded their native title claims as well 
as all potential claims in Western Australia’s southwest for land elsewhere. In an attempt to 
preserve those interests and argue that their laws were not extinguishable, the Bodney 
petitioners challenged the settlement before it went into effect. 
To provide the settlement with legal effect, Western Australia passed legislation that 
allowed it to enter into the agreement and abide by those terms.71 The final hurdle was 
registration of the six ILUAs. And this is where the Bygrave and McGlade cases become a 
central feature to evaluating the contradictory self-determination claims. Under Bygrave, the 
six ILUAs were registerable because a ‘majority’ had voted ‘yes’ – even though others disputed 
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the validity of the settlement and the formation of that majority. Some RNTC members would 
not sign the ILUAs, choosing instead to support the Bodney petitioners. They challenged the 
ILUA registrations in McGlade. There, the Full Federal Court overturned Bygrave, holding 
that all RNTC members must sign an ILUA for it to be registerable by the NNTT.72 In essence, 
it reinstituted the 1998 Amendments standard so the six ILUAs that comprised the settlement 
were no longer registerable. While McGlade re-legitimated the NTA and the Court as the 
judicial arbiter of native title, it also threatened to undermine the efforts and interests of the 
negotiators, which includes the Noongar Nation’s land, compensation and recognition as a 
Nation as well as Western Australia’s interests in securing commercial and legal stability. 
In response to McGlade, the Commonwealth sought to legislatively amend the NTA and 
re-institute a standard for ILUA registration that was relatively consistent with Bygrave. 
Commonwealth Attorney-General George Brandis released an Explanatory Memorandum 
which declared that the 2017 Amendments were necessary because ‘[t]he McGlade decision 
created uncertainty in the native title sector regarding the status of areas ILUAs’.73 Brandis’s 
concerns were that McGlade called into question the validity the roughly 120 ILUAs registered 
between 2010 and 2017 and all outstanding but not yet registered ILUAs, including the six 
Noongar/Western Australia ILUAs.74 In opposition to that view, as examined below others 
claimed that Brandis’s invocation of ‘uncertainty’ was an attempt to ‘manufacture’ a ‘crisis’ to 
support industry interests.75 That claim mirrors Short’s view that commercial interests were 
able to lobby for the NTA legislation by transforming a right claim that posed a ‘minor problem 
for an enormously affluent industrial lobby’ into a ‘national crisis’.76  Undoubtedly, the 2017 
Amendments would maintain and legitimate the Commonwealth’s and Western Australia’s 
legal authority and commercial interests. But because one of the reasons for passing the 2017 
Amendments was to support the Noongar Nation’s settlement with Western Australia, Brandis 
also justified the legislation as consistent with Indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination 
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as recognised in UNDRIP and elsewhere.77 That is not necessarily inaccurate, so long as the 
Noongar Nation is the Indigenous people that matter for international human rights purposes. 
But the Noongar Nation were not the only Aboriginal claimants asserting self-determination as 
Indigenous peoples. Various Aboriginal communities and others submitted comments to the 
Senate before Parliament passed the 2017 Amendments, many of whom cited self-
determination in support or opposition. 
Some Aboriginal Land Councils feared that McGlade cast doubt on their ILUAs and 
supported passing the 2017 Amendments.78 Likewise, SWALSC members and their supporters 
– those who constituted the Noongar Nation – claimed that the 2017 Amendments supported 
their self-determination.79 They saw the 2017 Amendments as providing them with the 
opportunity to obtain a settlement for land rights that the Crown would have extinguished either 
before the NTA came into effect in 1993,80 or under contemporary NTA processes.81 Glen Kelly, 
a SWALSC member, the lead negotiator for the Noongar Nation Negotiation Team, and writing 
on behalf of the NNTT, noted that the McGlade opinion disempowered native title claimants 
by providing holdouts with a veto over the majority, which would be inconsistent with ‘the 
principle of self determination and in contravention of article 3, 18, 21.1, 23, and 32.1 of the 
[UNDRIP]’.82  
On the other hand, some Noongar claimed that the 2017 Amendments ‘crushes the 
Human Rights of the Noongar people’ and is ‘in complete disregard for the [UNDRIP]’.83 Other 
Aboriginal groups supported this view, seeing the ‘proposed amendment [as] a direct violation 
of our Human Right, our right to self-determining [sic] and is in direct violation of our own 
First Nation Law and decision-making’.84 The Cape York Land Council argued that if 
Parliament passed the 2017 Amendments, it.would deprive the McGlade litigants of their self-
determination.85 The successful McGlade petitioners asserted that there were around 20,000 
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eligible Noongar voters and that only 1,578 voted to approve the ILUAs.86 They essentially 
argued that the SWALSC/Noongar Nation’s negotiation with Western Australia represented a 
politically mobilised minority rather than a majority of Noongar. Similarly, Albert Corunna, a 
self-identifying ‘Nyoongar Elder’ of the Swan River people asserted that SWALSC did not 
represent them and that the 2017 Amendments ‘will allow outsiders – who have not 
demonstrated their connection and are not prepared to give evidence in court – to sign away 
our property rights’.87 
Because the 2017 Amendments altered the NTA, which is Commonwealth law, the 
effects would impact all potential native title claimants.    
B. Wangan and Jagalingou claims to self-determination 
In July 2014, an energy company from India, Adani, received environmental approval 
to develop a coal deposit in Central Queensland. As planned, the mine would be on some native 
title land claimed by the Wangan and Jagalingou. After Adani’s negotiations with the Wangan 
and Jagalingou failed to obtain an ILUA, it sought approval through an RTN process.88 In 
response, Adrian Burragubba submitted an ‘unsolicited letter’ to the NNTT reviewing Adani’s 
RTN application.89 In the letter, Burragubba explained that the Traditional Owners Family 
Representative Council ('Family Council’) was a central governing body of an ‘indivisible 
whole’. He claimed the Family Council broadly represented the ‘heart of our rights as an 
Indigenous People, and the issue of obtaining our free, prior and informed consent for matters 
affecting our traditional territories, upon which we uphold all of our spiritual, cultural, family 
and social, environmental and economic values, rights and interests.’90 He asserted that the 
Wangan and Jagalingou Elders had self-determination, the ability to decide for themselves, and 
would continue to reject the project.91 Ultimately, the NNTT found that the leases could be 
granted as it was likely that the mine would have a net positive economic impact which would 
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be in the public interest.92 Burragubba then appealed that decision to the Federal Court, 
claiming that Adani had overinflated its economic benefits.93 The Federal Court denied the 
appeal in August 2016,94 which Burragubba then appealed to the Full Federal Court in 
September 2016. While litigation continued through the Courts, Adani continued to pursue an 
ILUA, which the Family Council opposed.  
While Adani continued to pursue an ILUA, in late 2015 Adani’s owner Gautam Adani 
held a private meeting with Australia’s Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull in an attempt to 
expedite the mine development. Adani asked Turnbull to introduce a law prohibiting activists 
from seeking further judicial review for the mine.95 He explained that multiple rounds of legal 
challenges were making the project uncertain and no ‘lenders will be willing to finance it’.96 
Again, industry members sought to use legislation to secure their commercial interests against 
otherwise legitimate legal challenges. The State did not adopt legislation specifically to help 
Adani, but the Noongar conflicts would present an opportunity to amend the NTA.   
In March 2016, a Wangan and Jagalingou claim group met and rejected an ILUA.97 
Media outlets then reported that the Wangan and Jagalingou had sought to finalise a deal, but 
it fell through because ‘anti-coal activists [were] funding Adani opponents within the 
indigenous group’.98 It quoted Irene White, a Wangan and Jagalingou member listed on the 
RNTC, who said, ‘last year, there was majority support in a vote of the native title applicants 
to go ahead with the negotiations … . And then last month, this public notice appears from 
another greenie, an Aboriginal woman from Victoria, to stop the agreement’.99 White 
continued, ‘[w]e have been saying this all along, and that it is about a future for our people. 
Why shouldn’t our kids get the opportunity to get a job, earn a living, buy a car and save up 
for a house just like any other Australians?’100  
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In the following month, April 2016, it was reported that seven of twelve RNTC 
members, a majority, agreed to an ILUA.101 Murrawah Johnson, a Family Council 
spokesperson, objected and accused Adani of bussing ‘in a large number of people, including 
non-members of our claim group who have no connection to the country’ to vote on the 
ILUA.102 Burragubba claimed, ‘[w]e are disadvantaged by the law and denied our international 
rights of self determination and free, prior informed consent. We are required to participate in 
the native title regime against a backdrop of financial disadvantage and discrimination’.103  
Under the Bygrave standard, which was in effect in April 2016, the ILUA was 
registerable even though Burragubba and other RNTC members had not signed it. As such, 
McGlade supported the Family Council’s interests because the NNTT could not register the 
Adani ILUA without all RNTC member signatures. Because the 2017 Amendments sought to 
return the ILUA registration process to the Bygrave standard, it threatened to undermine the 
Family Council’s interests and would allow Adani to register the ILUA and develop the mine.  
Before Parliament passed the 2017 Amendments, the Family Council submitted 
comments to the Senate. They claimed that the legislation was against their self-determination 
and that they had not given their FPIC.104 The Family Council published a press release that 
decried the ‘Adani Amendment’ as ‘a con on the public and part of a manufactured crisis.’105 
As mentioned above, that accusation mirrors Short’s analysis that industry lobbying efforts 
were able to pass the 1993 NTA legislation by transforming a judicial articulation of native title 
rights into a ‘national crisis’.106 The Family Council then appealed to Special Rapporteur 
Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, asserting that, ‘[t]his system does not respect indigenous peoples’ right 
to free, prior and informed consent, including our right to give or withhold our consent to a 
proposed destructive project, like a mine, on our traditional lands’.107  
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On the other hand, the lawyer for the Wangan and Jagalingou native title claim group 
submitted a comment to Parliament that the ‘majority’ partially supported the 2017 
Amendments.108  
3. Law’s Productive Domain and the Contradictory Claims  
This section analyses the way in which State law produces contradictory self-
determination claims and what that means for Indigenous peoples’ human rights. In examining 
the Noongar or the Wangan and Jagalingou struggles, it is too hasty to conclude that any 
group’s claim of self-determination is the ‘right’, ‘correct’ or ‘proper’ one. Each assertion of 
self-determination expresses claimants’ self-determination and self-interests. Each claimant is 
a legitimate actor with legitimate interests and various ways of self-identifying. And, yet, the 
self-determination claims arose from legal struggles and problems produced by the NTA, which 
shape and structure the claimants’ immediate interests and, hence, their self-determination 
claims.  
Those who claimed self-determination in support of the 2017 Amendments did so to 
protect their interests, which – to some degree – State law and the NTA produced. Kelly saw 
the negotiations as a ‘Nation to Nation dialogue’, which he explained as:  
a chance for us, as Noongars, to come to terms with today’s world and the undeniable fact that 
history cannot be undone, to secure recognition and rights to traditional lands and secure a 
footing in today’s world which can be used to advance our people and our culture in a way that 
works today . . . 109 
Resignation to the ‘terms of today’s world’, what others have been excoriated for calling ‘the 
tides of history’,110 to the NTA and its maintenance of the ‘power of colonialism’, shape as it 
produces a willingness to compromise with the State through state-sanctioned legal processes. 
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Kelly lamented how the creation and expansion of Perth and the surrounding areas extinguished 
the Noongar peoples’ native title claims to much of that land.111 But, as a negotiator, he saw an 
opportunity to trade that presumably foregone conclusion for official recognition, economic 
gain, and land elsewhere. That is an immense and pragmatic achievement. The rationale 
underlying Kelly’s views is reflected in Wangan and Jagalingou member Irene White’s 
question, ‘Why shouldn’t our kids get the opportunity to get a job, earn a living, buy a car and 
save up for a house just like any other Australians?’112  Like Kelly, White saw the ILUA with 
Adani as an opportunity to gain ‘a future for our people’ by negotiating over rights that they 
believe the State would otherwise extinguished.113 Both sought to use available State-based 
legal processes to achieve some gains rather than pursue costly and expensive litigation only 
to find that the State extinguished their rights.  
On the other hand, those who did not want to compromise with the State or enter into 
an ILUA held interests that were shaped by their opposition to the NTA. The Noongar who 
opposed the 2017 Amendments viewed the settlement as eroding any future claims, and their 
legitimacy to question the State, by blunting opposition to the illegitimate and exclusionary 
practices of the State.114 Likewise, Burragubba claimed the 2017 Amendments were ‘con on 
the public’ and railed against being ‘required to participate’ in the NTA.115 The Family Council 
and the McGlade and Bodney petitioners invoked self-determination against the 2017 
Amendments to preserve their oppositional positionality. Where they engaged in NTA litigation, 
it was to protect and establish their claims against others who believed that their rights were 
extinguished or extinguishable. 
Whether one supported or opposed the 2017 Amendments, the various communities’ 
interests were produced by State laws which the communities attempted to bolster by claiming 
self-determination. When the contradictory claim arose, State actors could side with those who 
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were willing to negotiate and comprise, which does several things. As a settler-state, Australia 
was able to legitimate its own assertions of sovereignty by recognising some Indigenous 
peoples’ self-determination claims and negotiating with them on a ‘nation-to-nation’ basis.116 
When it passed the 2017 Amendments, the State also legitimated the self-determination of the 
Noongar Nation, which has at least three other interrelated effects.  
First, the State was able to adopt legislation that weakened the NTA but upheld that 
legislation as consistent with Indigenous peoples’ human rights. As discussed above, CERD 
criticised the 1998 Amendments for creating an ILUA process that weakened the substantive 
rights contained in the NTA and violating Indigenous peoples’ self-determination and FPIC.117 
In 2010, Bygrave weakened the NTA standard for ILUA registration by making it easier to form 
and register agreements, which, in many cases, extinguishes native title rights. The 2017 
Amendments adopted a similar standard to Bygrave, which demonstrates a legislative 
weakening of the NTA. After the 2017 Amendments, the NTA  is ‘weaker’ than the NTA after 
the 1998 Amendments in the sense that it increases economic flexibility and possibility of 
extinguishment, which maintains what Watson identifies as the ‘power of colonialism’. 
However, it may benefit the ‘majority’. But who constitutes the majority and, furthermore, 
what processes determine who constitutes the majority are problematised below. The State 
asserted that these actions were consistent with Indigenous peoples’ self-determination, which 
some Aboriginal groups supported. This leads to the second effect.  
Second, there might be a reduction in the legal-political salience of Indigenous peoples’ 
human rights claims. For instance, if one views CERD’s criticisms of the 1998 Amendments as 
a yardstick for measuring Indigenous peoples’ human rights, a weaker post-2017 Amendments 
NTA would be even less consistent with Australia’s human rights obligations than it was after 
the 1998 Amendments. But the 2017 Amendments have not received the same criticism as the 
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1998 Amendments. The Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous peoples Victoria Tauli-
Corpuz commented that she was concerned about Australia’s passing the 2017 Amendments in 
a ‘rushed through’ manner, but also emphasised, ‘that the principle of free, informed and prior 
consent does not require the consent of all’.118 By commenting on the legislative process, and 
choosing not to address self-determination as a substantive issue, Tauli-Corpuz seemed to 
suggest that the McGlade standard is more burdensome than the international human right of 
FPIC – and that may very well be.119 But when compared to CERD’s criticisms of the 1998 
Amendments, Tauli-Corpuz’s unwillingness to take a more robust stand against the 2017 
Amendments, might reveal the legal-political diminution of Indigenous peoples’ human rights.   
The problem with that view, of course, is that there is not an idealised, abstract or 
singular Indigenous peoples subject, as CERD’s criticism presupposes. Instead, there are 
communities, groups, individuals, peoples and nations who have competing and contradictory 
approaches to State law who can invoke self-determination to support their interests. And in 
appreciating that, Tauli-Corpuz’s unwillingness to adopt a more critical stance towards the 
2017 Amendments could be viewed as a strategic and sophisticated way of upholding the self-
determination claims of the Noongar Nation as well as the putative majority of the Wangan 
and Jagalingou. And because there were contradictory self-determination claims, Tauli-Corpuz 
may also have – whether wittingly or not – legitimated State and industry interests too. And 
this relates to the third insight.  
Third, and potentially most problematic, the State’s ability to choose from among 
contradictory positions implicitly relied on State laws and processes to produce majority and 
minority positions, which the State could then legitimately uphold as constitutive of the 
majority interests. Questioning which group constitutes a majority returns us, in international 
law, to Pomerance’s ‘first and pivotal question’: ‘who is the ‘self’ to whom the right of self-
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determination attaches?’120 One could believe that State law merely clarifies or discovers who 
is or is not the minority. But that belief does not reveal how the Noongar Nation positioned and 
constructed itself to negotiate with the State or how others excluded as minorities. It further 
presupposes that majorities and minorities had been previously and firmly constructed or 
delineated and that the State was always going to negotiate with the Noongar Nation. That is 
untenable to believe. Bennell v Western Australia (‘Bennell’); Bodney v State of Western 
Australia (‘Bodney’) demonstrates that the Australian Commonwealth, the State of Western 
Australia, and local government initially opposed the native title claims of the Noongar Nation 
when those judicial claims could have undermined State legitimacy and commercial interests. 
State legal processes do not merely clarify or discover who is or is not a minority. Instead, State 
legal processes structure, create and produce what it recognises as the majority positions.121 As 
the following explains, when the State legitimated those who sought to compromise with the 
State by using State laws and processes, the State re-established its own legitimacy as a 
sovereign by legitimating the self-identity of those it recognised. The State constructed those 
who did not wish to compromise, those who maintained positions that were more oppositional 
to the State and its processes, as minorities. Consider how this happened. 
When the government of Western Australia chose to negotiate with the Noongar Nation 
Negotiation Team, it excluded the Bodney or McGlade petitioners and their interests, who then 
became identifiable as minorities of the Noongar Nation. In choosing to negotiate, the State 
validated a delineation between majority and minority positions which had been pre-
constructed by State law. The SWALSC-qua-Noongar Nation is a land council corporation 
registered according to Western Australia’s law,122 where the Bodney or McGlade petitioners 
are not. The SWALSC formed itself into the Noongar Nation ‘to come to terms with today’s 
world and . . . secure recognition and rights to traditional lands and secure a footing in today’s 
world which can be used to advance our people and our culture in a way that works today’.123 
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Stephen Cornell reads the events retrospectively – where the State had already legitimated the 
majority – to explain that ‘the Noongar Nation has used the native title process and land claims 
to assert the nationhood of a dispersed Indigenous population, taking a host of disparate claims 
and consolidating them under the umbrella of a Noongar Nation’.124 Although not inaccurate, 
it depends on as it presumes the legitimacy of the State and the Nation over the other more 
oppositional claims. For instance, Cornell’s assertion belies a reading that some Noongars, I 
assume, would dispute. He re-signifies those who may self-identify as Indigenous people, 
including the McGlade and Bodney petitioners,125 as members of an ‘Indigenous population’ 
who brought ‘disparate claims’ to be managed and properly represented by the majority-
Nation. That retrospective reading upholds the self-determination of the Noongar Nation but 
negates or overlooks that the so-called minorities are self-identifying people attempting to 
express their self-determination. Of course, those who formed themselves into the Noongar 
Nation performatively upheld themselves as a Nation to express their self-determination. That 
means, even if the Noongars had sovereignty, self-determination, and identified as a Nation 
before being recognised by the State, it is the State’s recognition that confers legitimacy on that 
determined self as those Indigenous peoples with self-determination. And in further submitting 
to and using the native title processes, they include themselves within the exclusionary domain 
of the State and reproduce that exclusionary domain by upholding itself as the Noongar Nation.  
Regarding the constitution of the majority and minority of the Wangan and Jagalingou, 
Justice Reeves (the same judge in Bygrave) previously compared how individuals constituted 
the Family Council to how many had voted for the April 2016 ILUA to find that the Family 
Council represents a ‘minority’ interest of the Wangan and Jagalingou.126 When the State 
passed the 2017 Amendments, it validated the claims and interests of the majorities, which State 
laws produced by delineating them from the minority positions of the abject domain. In the 
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Noongar and Wangan and Jagalingou contexts, those who use State process or conform to State 
laws were identified by the State as the majorities.  
In both scenarios, the newly formed ‘minorities’ actively disputed who the majorities 
were and that the formation of a ‘majority’ was legitimate. The McGlade petitioners stated that 
they were not minorities of the Noongar Nation.127 They accused SWALSC of bussing in select 
members to approve the ILUAs,128 which was a numerical minority of eligible voters129 and 
reflected an interest of ‘outsiders’.130 Similarly, the Family Council maintained that Adani 
bussed in ‘a “rent-a-crowd” of persons who had never previously identified as Wangan and 
Jagalingou people’ to approve the April 2016 ILUA.131 The Family Council maintains that 
almost seventy-five per cent of those who approved the April 2016 ILUA are not ‘true and 
valid Wangan and Jagalingou people’.132 By casting doubt on the representation and 
identification of the others, they attempted to performatively construct themselves as true, self-
determining Indigenous peoples.  
Wither Self-Determination?  
The Australian State’s settlement with and recognition of the Noongar Nation is 
remarkable. The settlement is likely a positive development for the Noongar Nation, but not all 
Noongar peoples and perhaps not the majority. While the struggle for self-determination 
continues, it is not a struggle that can be apprehended by considering who ‘wins’ claims. As 
argued here, understanding how States come to recognise a community as Indigenous peoples 
involves excavating the productive and formative aspects of State law and legal practice. In the 
situations explored in this article, State legal processes constructed and delineated the majority 
who has a self from the minority who belong to the abject domain. When the majority subjected 
itself to legal processes to compromise with the State, which State actors supported by 
negotiating with them and then passing the 2017 Amendments, it appears the State has upheld 
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the majority of Indigenous peoples’ self-determination. But before the State did that, it was not 
clear if there was majority position. And after the State has done so, it is not clear whose 
majority was upheld.  
The passage of the 2017 Amendments may benefit the most number of individuals who 
might be Australians, Noongars, or Indigenous peoples. Its passage will ensure flexibility and 
economic gain by preserving low barriers to ILUA registration.133 Although self-determination 
was invoked, and the Noongar Nation has achieved recognition from the State, the State also 
re-legitimated its assertions of sovereignty and ‘that law’s own regulatory hegemony’,134 while 
weakening the native title regime. When the State validated the Noongar Nation’s self-
determination and included them within its exclusionary domain, it also legitimated the 
Noongar Nation’s ‘taking host of [the] disparate claims’ to ‘consolidate them’ and its 
‘dispersed Indigenous population’.135 While potentially beneficial, there are two outstanding 
questions. First, where States confer recognition on internally colonised Nations while 
simultaneously maintaining the political-economic legitimacy of industry and the State, what 
prevents States from consolidating the disparate and divided claims of its Indigenous peoples 
and Nations as members of the States’ population? And, second, what is the expense for the 
newly constructed ‘minorities’ of the abject domain? Contrary to Lansing’s view, self-
determination is not ‘loaded with dynamite’, but maybe it should be ‘discredited’.136  
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